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ABSTRACT
Inflation in the 1990s in most industrial countries is lower and less variable than at
any time in the past quarter of a century. Economic theory predicts that, other things
equal, this decline in inflation variability should lead to less volatility in both bond
and foreign exchange markets. The paper tests these theoretical predictions and
finds some evidence that lower inflation variability leads to less volatility of bond
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1. INTRODUCTION
Financial market volatility is a topic of much contemporary interest. One reason for
this interest is the world-wide move to financial deregulation in the 1980s and the
associated rise in gross flows in the world’s financial markets. Together, these imply
a larger role for financial markets in the behaviour of the wider economy.
Interest in financial market volatility has also been heightened, however, because
from time to time, asset markets behave in ways that most people find inexplicable.
The signal recent example is the 1987 stockmarket crash when, despite the absence
of any obvious news, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by 22 per cent on
19 October 1987, triggering stockmarket crashes around the world.
Of course if everyone believed in the efficient markets hypothesis, financial market
volatility would not be very interesting. If we were confident that asset prices
efficiently incorporated all public information about economic fundamentals, then
financial market volatility would be for good reason and should not be a cause for
concern. In this case, volatile asset prices would simply reflect volatile economic
fundamentals.
This paper is concerned with the relationship between asset price volatility and the
volatility of a key economic fundamental: inflation. The focus is on bond and foreign
exchange markets and on the changes in volatility in these markets that occurred as
inflation around the world fell and became less variable.
Economic theory implies that a decline in the volatility of a country’s inflation rate
should lead, other things equal, to a decline in the volatility of its bond yields.
Similarly, a fall in the volatility of the inflation differential between countries should
lead to a fall in the volatility of their bilateral exchange rates. In this paper, we use
data on inflation, bond yields and exchange rates for many OECD countries over the
past two decades to test these theoretical predictions.2
We find some empirical evidence that cross-country differences in inflation volatility
help to explain cross-country differences in the volatility of bond yields. This
evidence is most compelling when countries with very volatile inflation rates are
included in the sample. We also find evidence that the widespread fall in inflation
volatility in the late 1980s and 1990s has been responsible for a fall in bond yield
volatility, although the fall in the volatility of bond yields has been less marked than
the fall in inflation volatility.
By contrast, for OECD countries with moderate inflation rates, there is little
evidence that the volatility of inflation differentials helps to explain exchange rate
volatility. The large fall in the volatility of the inflation differentials between many
pairs of countries in the 1990s has been associated with little, if any, systematic fall
in the volatility of their bilateral exchange rates.
The rest of the paper is divided into two sections. The next section marshals the
empirical evidence about inflation volatility and bond yield volatility on the one
hand, and inflation differential volatility and exchange rate volatility on the other.
The final section broadens the focus of the paper to consider the wider economic
debate about financial market volatility, and discusses why we find different results
in the bond and foreign exchange markets.
2. FINANCIAL MARKET VOLATILITY – SOME FACTS
2.1 The Bond Market
We set the scene for a discussion of volatility by examining the relationship between
the  level of inflation and the  level of nominal bond yields. The upper panel of
Figure 1 shows 12-month-ended inflation rates for five OECD countries since the
early 1970s. After the inflationary boom of the 1970s, inflation in all these countries
declined in the 1980s and fell further into the 1990s. The lower panel of Figure 1
shows nominal long bond yields for these five countries over the same time period.
Although the relationship between inflation and nominal bond yields is not always
close, the figure suggests that nominal bond yields fell along with inflation over the
course of the 1980s and into the 1990s.3






































As well as relying on visual evidence, we can also formalise the relationship
between bond yields and inflation. For country j, we decompose the nominal bond
yield, nj, into the expected real yield, rj, and expected inflation, p j
e :1
n r j j j
e ” +p . (1)
It follows that the average nominal bond yield over a period of time, nj, is given by:
n r j j j
e ” +p (2)
and the change in average nominal bond yields between two periods, Dnj, is given
by:
D D D n r j j j
e ” + p . (3)
We now make two assumptions to enable equations (2) and (3) to be estimated.
Firstly, we assume that capital mobility between countries is sufficiently high that
average real interest rates are approximately equalised across countries. Then,
r r j »  is the average world real interest rate in the period and  D D r r j »  is the
change in the average world real interest rate between two periods. Secondly, we
assume that average past inflation is a good proxy for expected future inflation.2










2 2 D D
(4)
                                                                                                                                  
1 The equation can alternatively be thought of as defining the expected real interest rate, rj, as
r n j j j
e ” -p .
2 This is quite a strong assumption, since at each point in time, the relevant measure of expected
inflation is expected inflation over the future life of the bond, which we proxy by actual
inflation over the past 12 months. Clearly, the longer the period of time over which averaging
is performed, the better this assumption should be.5
where p j  and Dp j  are the average inflation rate in a period and the change in the
average inflation rate between two periods.
We now divide our time period into three sub-periods of roughly equal length, 1973-
80, 1981-87 and 1988-95, and expand our sample to fourteen OECD countries.
Table 1 shows the result of estimating equation (4) for these fourteen countries, both
in levels form for the three time periods, and in difference form, between the first
and second periods, and the second and third periods.
Table 1: Inflation and the Level of Nominal Bond Yields
(Cross country regressions, 14 countries)
Levels
nj j = + a bp
Differences
D D nj j = + a b p
























Notes: (a) Standard errors are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
(b) **,* indicate that coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5 per cent and 10 per cent,
respectively.
(c) The regressions are over 14  countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, UK, US.
(d) Data for the UK starts in January 1976.
Over each seven year period, the average inflation rate explains a sizeable part of
the cross-country variation in average nominal bond yields, and the change in
average inflation from one period to the next explains much of the variation in the
change in average bond yields. Furthermore, each estimate of b, the coefficient on
average inflation or the change in average inflation, is of the expected positive sign
and highly significant.6
It also seems that nominal bonds yields have become more sensitive over time to the
average level of inflation.3 Be that as it may, the results overall are strongly
supportive of the simple economic idea that the level of inflation is a key explanator
of the level of nominal bond yields.
As a simple test of the robustness of these results, we repeat the regression analysis
excluding from the sample two countries (Italy and New Zealand) with high
inflation over much of the period. The results when these countries are excluded are
reported in Table 2. There is minimal difference between the two tables suggesting
that the original results do not simply arise from the anomalous behaviour of a
couple of high-inflation countries. Of course, none of this should come as a surprise.
It is very much part of received economic wisdom that inflation is a key determinant
of nominal bond yields.
Table 2: Inflation and the Level of Nominal Bond Yields
(Cross country regressions, 12 countries)
Levels
nj j = + a bp
Differences
D D nj j = + a b p
























Notes: (a) Standard errors are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
(b) **,* indicate that coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5 per cent and 10 per cent,
respectively.
(c) The regressions are over 12 countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Japan, Norway, UK, US.
(d) Data for the UK start in January 1976.
                                                                                                                                  
3 The market for government long bonds in many countries was subject to substantial regulation
in the 1970s and early 1980s which may help to explain the weaker relationship between bond
yields and inflation in the earlier periods. See Bröker (1993) for further details.7
We now turn to the issue of central interest. Does the simple and strong cross-
country relationship between levels of inflation and nominal bond yields translate
into a similar relationship between the variability, or volatility, of inflation and the
volatility of bond yields?
Figure 2: Average Inflation and Inflation Variability Across the OECD
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Average inflation
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Note: The figure shows average 12-month-ended inflation and its standard deviation for 19 OECD countries.
See Data Appendix for further details.
Figure 2 shows average inflation in 19 OECD countries as well as the standard
deviation of inflation rates across these countries. Inflation in the 1990s is not only
lower than in the previous two decades, it is also less variable, with the standard
deviation of inflation across the 19 countries lower in 1995 than at any time in the
past quarter of a century.
Importantly, this lower variability of inflation in the 1990s is evident not only across
countries at a point in time, as shown in Figure 2, but also within individual
countries over time. Table 3A shows inflation volatility (measured by an average of
the standard deviation of 12-month-ended inflation rates) in fourteen OECD
countries over the periods, 1973-87 and 1988-95. In all fourteen countries, inflation
volatility is lower in the latter period than in the former.8
Table 3A: Volatility in Inflation Rates
Inflation volatility Percentage
1974-87 1988-95 change
Germany 0.39 0.28 -28.6
US 0.80 0.22 -73.0
Australia 1.23 0.62 -49.6
Japan 1.19 0.33 -72.8
UK 1.50 0.58 -61.3
Italy 2.66 1.19 -55.2
France 1.09 0.30 -72.7
Canada 0.72 0.61 -15.5
Belgium 1.55 0.68 -56.0
Denmark 1.84 0.62 -66.5
Finland 1.07 0.60 -44.1
Ireland 2.08 0.45 -78.4
New Zealand 1.67 1.11 -33.5
Norway 0.96 0.56 -41.9
Note: Inflation volatility is the average, over each period, of 12-month-ended standard deviations of the
12-month-ended percentage change in consumer prices. In the first period, 12-month-ended standard
deviations start in January 1974, except for the UK which starts in November 1976.
Table 3B: Volatility in Bond Yields
Inflation volatility Percentage
1974-87 1988-95 change
Germany 0.44 0.37 -17.7
US 0.63 0.41 -35.5
Australia 0.55 0.67 21.4
Japan 0.44 0.44 -0.4
UK 0.86 0.53 -38.1
Italy 0.81 0.70 -14.1
France 0.59 0.45 -23.3
Canada 0.60 0.45 -25.1
Belgium 0.40 0.37 -7.1
Denmark 1.03 0.58 -43.4
Finland 0.43 0.76 75.3
Ireland 0.96 0.54 -43.7
New Zealand 0.70 0.65 -7.6
Norway 0.31 0.52 70.4
Note: Bond yield volatility is the average, over each period, of 12-month-ended standard deviations of monthly
bond yields. In the first period, 12-month-ended standard deviations start in January 1974, except for the
UK which starts in November 1976.9
Has this lower inflation volatility translated into less volatility of bond yields?
Table 3B shows bond yield volatility (measured by an average of the standard
deviation of monthly bond yields) for the same countries. For most countries, though
not all, bond yield volatility has also declined over time. Somewhat disappointingly,
the proportionate fall in bond yield volatility is usually much smaller than the fall in
inflation volatility. In only a single country, Canada, was the percentage decline in
bond yield volatility between the two periods larger than the decline in inflation
volatility, while in three countries (Australia, Finland, and Norway) bond yield
volatility was higher in the second period than in the first, despite falls in the
volatility of inflation rates in each case greater than 40 per cent.
Visual evidence is also provided by Figure 3 which shows a two-panel figure for the
G3 countries, with inflation volatility in the upper panel and bond yield volatility in
the lower panel. Again, the fall in inflation volatility appears much more pronounced
than the fall in the volatility of bond yields.10
Figure 3: Inflation and Bond Yield Volatility for the G3 Countries































Notes: Inflation volatility is the standard deviation, over the past 12 months, of monthly readings of the
12-month-ended inflation rate. Bond yields volatility is the standard deviation, over the past 12 months,
of long bond yields (sampled monthly).
As before, we need not rely solely on visual evidence. We can also use the
decomposition of the nominal bond yield into the expected real yield and expected
inflation introduced earlier (equation (1)), to derive the relationship between the
variance of nominal bond yields and the variances and covariance of the expected
real yield and expected inflation:
Var n Var r Var Cov r T j T j T j
e
T j j
e ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ” + + p p 2 (5)11
where the notation VarT() means the variance evaluated over the past T months. As
before, we take an average over time of equation (5) to give:
Var n Var r Var Cov r T j T j T j
e
T j j
e ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ” + + p p 2 . (6)
We make similar assumptions to those above, that  ( ) ( ) Var r Var r t j T =  and that
( ) ( ) Var Var t j
e
T j p g p = , and also assume that the covariance term is constant.4 This
again leads to an equation we can estimate:
Var n Var T j T j ( ) ( ) = + a b p . (7)
Equation (7) has a very simple interpretation. The average variance, over time, of
nominal bond yields should be positively related to the average variance of inflation
rates. We divide the time-period into three sub-periods, 1973-80, 1981-87 and
1988-95, and estimate equation (7) for the sample of fourteen OECD countries, both
in levels for the three time periods, and in difference form between the first and
second periods, and the second and third periods. Using two values for  T,
T = 12 months and T = 84 months (7 years), we report the results in Table 4.5
                                                                                                                                  
4 The assumption that Var Var T j
e
T j ( ) ( ) p g p =  can be justified in the simple case when inflation
in each country follows a stationary AR(1) process, p rp e t t t
j = + -1 ,  r <1, where et
j is the
shock at time t specific to country j. For N-period bonds, assuming inflationary expectations
over the life of the bond are rational, p j
e  at time-t is given by p p p j
e
t t t N E N = + + + + ( )/ 1 K .
It is straightforward to show that  Et t k
k
t p r p + = , and hence that
p r r r p j
e N
t N = + + + ( ) / 2 K   =d pt  where  d <1. Taking unconditional variances of both
sides gives  Var Var j
e
j ( ) ( ) p g p =  where  g d = < 2 1 and  Var j ( ) p  is the unconditional
variance of actual inflation in country j.
5 Using T = 12 months generates an average over the sample of the variance within a year, while
T = 84 months generates the average variance over the sample. Both approaches generate a
consistent estimate of the population variance for a stationary stochastic variable with no
autocorrelation. T = 12 months implies that, each month, we calculate the 12-month-ended
variances of  nj, the nominal bond rate (sampled monthly) and of  p j , which is itself the
12-month-ended inflation rate. These 12-month-ended variances are then averaged over the12
Table 4: The Volatility of Inflation and the Volatility of Nominal Bond Yields
(Cross country regressions, 14 countries)
Levels
s a bs p 12
2
12
2 ( ) ( ) nj j = +
Differences
D D s a b s p 12
2
12
2 ( ) ( ) nj j = +
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Notes: (a) Standard errors are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
(b) The 12-month-ended variances are averages for the three sub-periods. For the first sub-period, the
12-month-ended variance starts in January 1974 with the exception of the UK which starts in
November 1976.
(c) 84 month variances are calculated over the periods: January 1974 to December 1980, July 1981 to
June 1988, and July 1988 to June 1995. UK data starts in January 1976.
(d) **,* indicate that coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5 per cent and 10 per cent,
respectively.
(e) The regressions are over 14 countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, UK, US.
                                                                                                                                  
seven-year sample to generate Var nj 12( )  and Var j 12( ) p . Alternatively, using T = 84 months
(7 years) implies that the 84 month variances of nominal interest rates (sampled monthly),
Var nj 84( ), and of the 12-month-ended inflation rate, Var j 84( ) p , are calculated directly for
each sample. The reason for calculating the variance of 12-month-ended inflation rates, rather
than, for example, the variance of monthly inflation rates, is to deal with the possibility of
seasonality in the inflation rate of some countries, which will raise the variance of monthly
inflation rates even when underlying inflation is no more variable. Calculating the variance of
12-month-ended inflation rates eliminates this problem.13
With only a single exception, the parameter  b is estimated to be positive, as
expected. That is, higher inflation volatility is correlated with higher volatility of
bond yields. Furthermore, b is statistically significant in many cases. Judged by the
regression  R s 2'  of the equations, however, the explanatory power of equation (7) is
usually much lower than the comparable cross-country relationship between the
level of inflation and the level of nominal bond yields (equation (4)).
We again test the robustness of the results by eliminating Italy and New Zealand
from the sample and repeating the regressions. The results are reported in Table 5.
In contrast to the earlier case, leaving out these two countries does make a
substantial difference to the results. Although the estimates of  b continue to be
positive in most cases, they are much less statistically significant. Furthermore, in
many cases, the regressions have little explanatory power. This is suggestive of a
threshold effect. When volatility is relatively low, there is little apparent relationship
between the volatility of inflation and bond yields, while with higher volatility, the
relationship appears stronger.
It is worth examining the empirical implications of these regression results. For the
12 country regressions in Table 5, there is only a single regression that generates a
significant estimate of b (namely the regression  ( ) ( ) s a bs p 84
2
84
2 nj j = +  estimated
over 1988-95). Using this regression, a 50 per cent fall in the variance of inflation is
estimated to lead to a 34 per cent fall in the variance of bond yields.6 This is,
however, the largest predicted fall in the variance of bond yields in the table. All the
other estimates imply that halving the variance of inflation leads to a much smaller
fall in the variance of bond yields.
                                                                                                                                  
6 This estimate is evaluated at the average, over the 12 countries, of the variance of inflation.14
Table 5: The Volatility of Inflation and the Volatility of Nominal Bond Yields
(Cross country regressions, 12 countries)
Levels
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Notes: (a) Standard errors are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
(b) The 12-month-ended variances are averages for the three sub-periods. For the first sub-period, the
12-month-ended variance starts in January 1974 with the exception of the UK which starts in
November 1976.
(c) 84 month variances are calculated over the periods: January 1974 to December 1980, July 1981 to
June 1988, and July 1988 to June 1995. UK data starts in January 1976.
(d) **,* indicate that coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5 per cent and 10 per cent,
respectively.
(e) The regressions are over 12 countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Japan, Norway, UK, US.
There is a theoretically-compelling reason to expect the elasticity of the variance of
bond yields with respect to the variance of the inflation rate,  e p n , to be less than
one. Any variation in expected real yields over time acts to reduce this elasticity.7
                                                                                                                                  
7 From equation (6), it follows that  e s p s s p s p p n T j
e
T j T j
e
T j j
e r r = + + 2 2 2 2 ( )/[ ( ) ( ) ( , )], with
obvious notation. Provided s p s T j j
e
T j r r ( , ) / ( ) >-1
2
2 , which seems likely, the elasticity must
be less than one, and falls as s T j r 2 ( ) rises.15
Nevertheless, the small apparent response of bond yield volatility to changes in
inflation volatility should be disappointing to those who argue that volatile asset
prices are primarily a consequence of volatile economic fundamentals. Furthermore,
rationalising the small apparent response in terms of time-varying real yields is
simply an admission of ignorance, since the time variation of expected real yields is
unobservable.
To summarise, the evidence that countries with more volatile inflation rates also
have more volatile bond yields is strongest when countries with very volatile
inflation rates are included in the sample. When they are excluded, there is still
some evidence that more volatile inflation rates generate more volatile bond yields.
Consistent with this evidence, the fall in inflation volatility in most countries in the
OECD has occurred at the same time as a (proportionately smaller) fall in bond
yield volatility. However, it is also clear that the empirical relationship between the
volatility of inflation and the volatility of nominal bond yields is much weaker than
the relationship between the level of inflation and the level of bond yields.
2.2 The Foreign Exchange Market
We turn now to the foreign exchange market. Again, to set the scene for the
discussion of volatility to follow, we begin with the relationship between the level of
the exchange rate and the relative domestic and foreign price levels.
The theory of purchasing power parity (PPP) asserts that nominal exchange rates
move to offset inflation differentials between countries. As is well known, for
countries with moderate inflation rates, PPP provides almost no guidance for
exchange rate movements over short periods: a month, a quarter or even a year.
Over longer periods of time, however, it does provide some guide for exchange rate
movements. We test PPP over the three sub-periods, 1973-80, 1981-87 and
1988-95, and over the time period as a whole, 1973-95. To do so, we run the
regression:
D D % %( / ) E P P j
f d
j = + a b (8)
where D%Ej  is the percentage change in the j-th exchange rate from the beginning
of the period to its end,  Ej is the foreign currency price of a unit of domestic16
currency, and  D%( / ) P P f d
j is the percentage change in the ratio of foreign to
domestic consumer prices. The results of estimating equation (8) for five exchange
rates are shown in Table 6.8
Table 6: Testing Purchasing Power Parity
(Regressions over 5 exchange rates)






















Note: The variables in the regression are calculated from the first to last month in each period. **,* indicate
that coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively. The
regressions use 5 exchange rates and their corresponding price differentials: AUD/USD, USD/YEN,
USD/DEM, GBP/USD, USD/CAD. Exchange rates and inflation differentials which include the UK
start in December 1974.
The equation has almost no explanatory power in the period immediately following
OPEC I, 1973-80. It performs quite well, however, over the second and third time
periods, 1981-87 and 1988-95. Over these sub-periods and over the period as a
whole, 1973-95, b is insignificantly different from unity and the regressions explain
a substantial part of the variation in exchange rate changes.
We turn now to exchange rate volatility. From the perspective of economic theory, it
is the volatility of the inflation differential between two countries, rather than the
                                                                                                                                  
8 We restrict the sample to five independent exchange rates, because adding cross-rates to the
regression does not add any new information. Thus, for example, for countries A, B, and C,
the monthly percentage change in exchange rate AC is (approximately) equal to the sum of the
monthly percentage changes in exchange rates AB and BC. The majority of exchange rates
used for the regressions floated throughout the period 1973-95. The Australian dollar,
however, although fairly flexible, was not floated until 1983. Thus, when the Bretton-Woods
system broke down in 1973, Australia maintained its peg to the US$. By 1974, the peg was
changed to one with a basket of currencies. This system again changed in 1976, and from then
until 1983, the Australian dollar was on a crawling peg (adjusted daily) against the US$.17
volatility of inflation in either country on its own, that should be relevant to the
volatility of the exchange rate between them. All exchange rate models predict that
nominal shocks that have an effect on the inflation differential between two
countries will also affect their bilateral exchange rate. We should also expect the
link between the volatility of inflation differentials and exchange rate volatility to be
a strong one. With sticky goods prices in each country, nominal shocks should have
a disproportionate effect on exchange rate volatility, because asset market
equilibrium requires the exchange rate to adjust more in the short run than in the
long run (Dornbusch 1976). This effect is also strengthened because, given the
inertia of the inflation process, a positive inflation shock implies not only a higher
price level, but also a higher rate of inflation for some time into the future. With a
forward-looking foreign exchange market, this again implies a disproportionate
exchange rate response to inflation shocks (Lyons 1990).
As we have seen earlier in Figure 2, the variability of inflation rates across the
OECD fell steadily in the 1990s, and by 1995 was lower than at any time in the past
quarter of a century. Not surprisingly, this generalised decline in inflation variability
is also manifest in a decline in the volatility of inflation differentials between many
pairs of countries. Table 7 shows the volatility of inflation differentials for six
country pairs. As the table shows, the volatility of the inflation differential for these
six country pairs declines by between 40 and 70 per cent from 1973-87 to 1988-95.
Table 7 also shows the volatility of the exchange rates for the same six country
pairs. As is clear from the table, the pattern of exchange rate volatilities is markedly
different from the pattern of inflation differential volatilities. By contrast with
inflation differential volatilities, there is little systematic change in exchange rate
volatilities from 1973-87 to 1988-95, with three exchange rates exhibiting a decline
in average volatility and three experiencing a rise.18
Table 7: Volatility in Inflation Differentials and Exchange Rates
Inflation differential volatilities Percentage change
1973-80 1981-87 1988-95 1973-87 to
1988-95
Australia/US 1.2 1.2 0.7 -44.4
Australia/Japan 2.0 1.0 0.7 -52.4
Australia/Germany 1.5 0.9 0.7 -42.3
US/Japan 1.6 0.7 0.4 -69.3
Germany/Japan 1.7 0.7 0.4 -63.1
US/Germany 0.9 0.7 0.4 -54.2
Exchange rate volatilities Percentage change
1973-80 1981-87 1988-95 1973-87 to
1988-95
AUD/USD 2.3 2.9 2.5 -1.8
AUD/YEN 3.4 3.7 3.9 9.6
AUD/DEM 3.5 3.6 4.3 21.0
USD/YEN 3.0 3.2 3.1 -1.2
DEM/YEN 3.3 2.9 2.6 -15.5
USD/DEM 3.3 3.2 3.3 2.2
Note: Inflation differential volatility is the average, over each period, of 12-month-ended standard deviations
of the difference between the respective countries’ 12-month-ended percentage change in consumer
prices. Exchange rate volatility is the average, over each period, of 12-month-ended standard deviations
of monthly percentage changes in the exchange rate. In the first period, 12-month-ended standard
deviations start in January 1974.
Figure 4 shows an equally striking example of the apparent lack of relationship
between the volatility of the inflation differential and exchange rate volatility.
Despite a huge fall in the volatility of the US/Japan inflation differential between the
mid 1970s and the 1990s, there is no apparent change in the volatility of the US$/¥
exchange rate.19
Figure 4: The Volatility of the US/Japan Inflation Differential and the
US$/¥ Exchange Rate


















Note: The US/Japan inflation differential volatility is the standard deviation, over the past 12 months, of
monthly readings of the difference between Japanese and US 12-month-ended inflation. Exchange rate
volatility is the standard deviation, over the past 12 months, of the monthly percentage change in the
US$/¥ exchange rate.
We can also test this conclusion with regression analysis. In Tables 8 and 9 we
report the results of a range of regressions similar to those presented above for the
bond market. In each regression a measure of exchange rate volatility is regressed
on a measure of the volatility of the inflation differential between the relevant two
countries. Using period averages over the same three time periods as before, we
perform cross-exchange rate regressions over thirteen exchange rates.9
                                                                                                                                  
9 The thirteen exchange rates include the independent exchange rates used for Table 6 (with the
exception of the USD/CAD – excluded because, in terms of volatility, it appears to be a special
case, perhaps because of the overwhelming role of the US in Canadian trade) plus several
cross-rates. Cross-rates may be included in the regression for the following reason. While the
monthly percentage change in exchange rate AC is (approximately) equal to the sum of the
monthly percentage changes in exchange rates AB and BC, the same statement is not true for
the variance of monthly percentage changes, because there is also a covariance term. As a
consequence, including cross-rates in the regression adds new information.20
Table 8: The Volatility of Inflation Differentials and the Volatility of
Exchange Rates
(Regressions over 13 exchange rates)
Levels
s a bs p p 12
2
12
2 ( ) ( ) De f d = + -
Differences
D D D s a b s p p 12
2
12
2 ( ) ( ) e f d = + -
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Notes: (a) Standard errors are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. **,* indicate that
coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively.
(b) In the upper panel, the average, over each period, of 12-month-ended variances of monthly exchange
rate percentage changes is regressed on the average, over each period, of 12-month-ended variances
of 12-month-ended inflation differentials, while in the lower panel, the average, over each period, of
12-month-ended standard deviations of monthly exchange rate percentage changes is regressed on
the average, over each period, of 12-month-ended standard deviations of 12-month-ended inflation
differentials.
(c) The regressions use 13 exchange rates and their corresponding inflation differentials: AUD/USD,
AUD/YEN, AUD/DEM, AUD/CAD, AUD/GBP, DEM/YEN, USD/YEN, CAD/YEN, GBP/YEN,
USD/DEM, GBP/USD, CAD/DEM, GBP/CAD.
(d) 12-month-ended variances (standard deviations) start in January 1974 with the exception of the UK
which starts in November 1976.21
Table 9: The Volatility of Inflation Differentials and the Volatility of
Exchange Rates
(Regressions over 13 exchange rates)
Levels
s a bs p p 84
2
84
2 ( ) ( ) De f d = + -
Differences
D D D s a b s p p 84
2
84
2 ( ) ( ) e f d = + -




























0.09 – – –
Levels
s a bs p p 84 84 ( ) ( ) De f d = + -
Differences
D D D s a b s p p 84 84 ( ) ( ) e f d = + -




























0.08 – – –
Notes: (a) Standard errors are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. **,* indicate that
coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively.
(b) In the upper panel, the average variance, over the 84 months in each period, of monthly exchange
rate percentage changes is regressed on the average variance, over the 84 months in each period, of
12-month-ended inflation differentials, while in the lower panel, the average standard deviation, over
the 84 months in each period, of monthly exchange rate percentage changes is regressed on the
average standard deviation, over the 84 months in each period, of 12-month-ended inflation
differentials.
(c) The regressions use 13 exchange rates and their corresponding inflation differentials: AUD/USD,
AUD/YEN, AUD/DEM, AUD/CAD, AUD/GBP, DEM/YEN, USD/YEN, CAD/YEN, GBP/YEN,
USD/DEM, GBP/USD, CAD/DEM, GBP/CAD.
(d) The 84 month variances (standard deviations) are calculated over the periods: January 1974 to
December 1980, July 1981 to June 1988,  and July 1988 to June 1995. Exchange rates including the
UK start in January 1976.22
Two things stand out from the results in the tables. Firstly, although the coefficient b
is almost always of the expected positive sign – implying that higher exchange rate
volatility is correlated with higher volatility of inflation differentials – it is almost
always statistically insignificant. Secondly, since most of the regression R2's in the
two tables are less than 0.1, very little of the cross-exchange rate variation in
volatility is explained by variation in the volatility of the corresponding inflation
differential.
As we did for bond market volatility, we can also examine the empirical
implications of these regression results. Of the regressions in the two tables, the
regression  ( ) ( ) s a bs p p 84
2
84
2 De f d = + -  estimated over 1988-95 generates the
most significant estimate of  b. Using this regression, a 50 per cent fall in the
variance of the inflation differential between two countries is estimated to lead to a
14 per cent fall in the variance of their bilateral exchange rate.10 Note however, both
that this is quite a small estimated fall in exchange rate variance, and that it is the
largest predicted fall in the variance of the exchange rate in the table. All the other
estimates imply that halving the variance of the inflation differential leads to a much
smaller fall in the variance of the corresponding exchange rate.
We may summarise our results for the foreign exchange market as follows. Other
things equal, economic theory predicts that a decline in the volatility of the inflation
differential between countries should reduce the volatility of their bilateral exchange
rates. With sticky goods prices in each country, this link between the volatilities of
inflation differentials and exchange rates should be particularly strong. Empirically,
however, for OECD countries with moderate inflation rates, there is little evidence
that the volatility of inflation differentials helps explain exchange rate volatility.
While inflation differences between countries that persist for several years make an
important difference to the level of their bilateral exchange rates, differences in the
volatility of inflation differentials for the same group of countries make little, if any,
difference to their bilateral exchange rate volatilities. Similarly, the big fall in the
volatility of the inflation differential between many pairs of countries in the late
                                                                                                                                  
10 This estimate is evaluated at the average, across the 13 country pairs, of the variance of
inflation differentials. As before, given the form of the regression equation, the estimated
elasticity of the variance of monthly exchange rate changes with respect to the variance of the
inflation differential should be less than unity. Recall that using a similar methodology in the
bond market, a 50 per cent fall in the variance of inflation is estimated to lead to a 34 per cent
decline in the variance of bond yields.23
1980s and 1990s has been associated with little, if any, systematic fall in the
volatility of their bilateral exchange rates.
3. WHAT CAN ECONOMISTS SAY ABOUT FINANCIAL MARKET
VOLATILITY?
In seeking to understand volatility in bond and foreign exchange markets, it is of
interest to touch on the wider debate about financial market volatility. There has
been a lively academic debate, given initial impetus by Shiller (1981) and LeRoy
and Porter (1981) about whether financial market volatility is ‘excessive’ or not.
The debate focuses primarily on the stockmarket and on the issue of whether the
volatility of stock prices can be justified by the volatility of the discounted stream of
future dividends. Ultimately, the relevent statistical tests have a joint null hypothesis
of market efficiency and a specific model of the discount rate used to discount future
dividends.11 As a consequence, when the data imply rejection of this joint
hypothesis (as they invariably do) it is not clear whether this is a demonstration that
financial market volatility is indeed excessive, compared to the volatility to be
expected of an efficient market, or instead, simply a rejection of the specific model
of the discount rate (see Shiller (1989), and comments on Shiller by
Cochrane (1991)).
There is, however, other evidence about the nature of asset market volatility
provided by two ‘events’ in the stockmarket. Although not new, this evidence is
compelling and hence worth examining. The first event is a paperwork backlog (!) at
the New York and American Stock Exchanges, which led these exchanges to be
closed on Wednesdays during the second half of 1968.
French and Roll (1986) use this event to compare the movement of stock prices
from the Tuesday close of the exchange to the Thursday close in weeks when the
exchange was closed on Wednesday because of the paperwork backlog, with the
movement in weeks when it was open. Paperwork backlogs at the stock exchange
should be irrelevant to the Tuesday-close-to-Thursday-close performance of
companies listed on the exchange. Hence, if stock prices move solely because of the
                                                                                                                                  
11 For example, two common specific models are that the discount rate is constant through time,
or that it is equal to the real interest rate plus a constant risk premium.24
arrival of new relevant information about the companies listed, then the average
variance of stock returns in a two-day period including a Wednesday exchange
holiday should be the same as an average two-day period with the exchange open on
both days, or equivalently, twice the variance of an average single day on which the
exchange is open.12 In fact, French and Roll find that the average variance of stock
prices over two days including an exchange holiday is much closer to the variance
over an average single day than an average two-day period with the exchange open
on both days.13
The second event that casts light on asset market volatility is the 1987 stockmarket
crash. Based on questionnaires completed in its aftermath by both institutional and
individual investors, Shiller (1988) concludes that:
‘no news event, other than news of the crash itself, precipitated the crash. Rather,
the dynamics of stock market prices seem to have more to do with the internal
dynamics of investor thinking, and the medium of communications among large
groups of investors is price. In a period when there is a widespread opinion that
the market is under or overpriced, investors are standing ready to sell. It takes only
a nudge in prices, something to get them reacting, to set off a major market move.’
Clearly, neither of these examples imply that asset prices do not respond to changes
in economic fundamentals. They do, however, provide compelling evidence that
some of the short-term movement in asset markets cannot be explained in terms of
the efficient incorporation of public information about fundamentals. Instead, at
least some asset price volatility appears to arise from the process of trading
introducing noise into asset prices.14
                                                                                                                                  
12 With stock price movements closely approximating a random walk, the average variance over
two days is twice the average variance over a single day.
13 The average two-day variance spanning an exchange holiday is 14.5 per cent higher than an
average single ‘open’ day, whereas an average two-day period with the exchange open on both
days has a variance of stock price movements 75 per cent higher than a two-day period
spanning an exchange holiday.
14 It is beyond our scope to discuss the social costs of excessive financial market volatility. Even
if there is substantial volatility introduced by the process of trading, however, the associated
social costs may be small (Cochrane 1991, pp. 20-23).25
Returning to volatility in the bond and foreign exchange markets, it is worth
commenting on economists’ different level of understanding of these two markets.
In the bond market, there is little controversy about the determinants of bond yields.
There is a simple underlying model of nominal bond yields and agreement among
economists about the explanatory power of this model. As we have discussed, the
nominal bond yield can usefully be decomposed into the expected real yield and
expected inflation over the life of the bond. Although risk premia differ between
countries, expected real yields on government long bonds are similar in OECD
countries with open capital markets and infinitesimal risks of default. Furthermore,
expected future inflation responds, probably with a lag, to actual inflation, so that
differences in actual inflation explain a substantial part of differences in nominal
bond yields between countries (Tables 1 and 2). Although the bond market moves in
puzzling ways at times, with 1994-95 being a prime example, economists are rightly
confident that they have a good understanding of the economic forces that determine
bond yields.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the foreign exchange market. For OECD
countries with moderate inflation rates, it is true that PPP provides some guide for
movements in floating exchange rates over many years (Table 6). Over shorter
periods of time, however, there is simply no underlying model, agreed upon by
economists, that explains the movement of exchange rates. Instead, exchange rates
are apparently subject to a myriad of influences, and there has been little success
uncovering the economic fundamentals – or, for that matter, other forces – that
determine their shorter-term movements. As Richard Meese (1990) puts it:
‘The proportion of (monthly or quarterly) exchange rate changes that current
models can explain is essentially zero. Even after-the-fact forecasts that use actual
values (instead of forecasted values) of the explanatory variables cannot explain
major currency movements over the post-Bretton Woods era. This result is quite
surprising.’ (italics added)
The extent to which fundamentals explain the shorter-term movements of bond
yields and exchange rates is relevant to understanding volatility in these two
markets. In the bond market, where economic fundamentals provide a convincing
explanation for much of the movement of bond yields, one might reasonably expect
a change in economic fundamentals – like a fall in the volatility of inflation – to have
a significant and predictable influence on bond yield volatility. By contrast, in the
foreign exchange market, where for reasons that are not fully understood, economic26
fundamentals apparently explain very little of the movement of exchange rates over
times of relevance to volatility, one should be less confident that changes in
economic fundamentals will have a measurable influence on market volatility.
These observations accord quite well with our empirical results. The world-wide fall
in the 1990s in the volatility of inflation seems to have been responsible for at least
some fall in the volatility of bond yields. By contrast, and notwithstanding the
predictions of economic theory, there has been little, if any, fall in the volatility of
exchange rates despite a substantial fall in the volatility of inflation differentials
between countries.27
APPENDIX: DATA
Data for long term nominal interest rates are as follows:
Australia 10 year Treasury bond yield, RBA Bulletin, Table F.2.
Belgium Interest rate on 5 year central government bonds, OECD.
Canada Interest rate on 10 year federal government bonds
(Wednesday average), OECD.
Denmark Interest rate on 10 year government bond (end period), OECD.
Germany Interest rate on public sector bonds with 7 to 15 years to
maturity, OECD.
Finland Long term interest rate on taxable public bonds with 3 to 6 years
to maturity (monthly average), OECD.
France Interest rate on government bonds with over 7 years to maturity
to maturity (monthly average), OECD.
Ireland Interest rate on central government bonds with 5 years to
maturity, OECD.
Italy Yield on treasury bonds with average maturity of 2.5 years,
OECD.
Japan Compound interest rate on government bonds with 8 to 10 years
to maturity (month end), Datastream.
New Zealand Interest rate on 10 year government bonds (month end), OECD.
Norway Interest rate on central government bonds with 6 to 10 years
maturity (month end), OECD.
UK Interest rate on 10 year government bonds, OECD.
US 10 year (constant maturity) bond yield, OECD.28
Inflation data and their sources are as follows:
Australia Australian underlying inflation (Treasury series). For empirical
analysis requiring a monthly series, we use:
Australian manufacturing prices (excluding petrol from
July 1979), Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Belgium All goods less food, OECD.
Canada All items less food, OECD.
Denmark All items less food, OECD.
Finland All items less food, OECD.
France All items less food, OECD.
Germany CPI excluding food and energy, Bundesbank.
Greece All items, OECD.
Ireland All items, OECD. Data for this series are available quarterly. To
construct a monthly series we assume the index is unchanged in
the quarter.
Italy All goods less food, OECD.
Japan All items less food, OECD.
Luxembourg All items less food, OECD.
Netherlands All items less food, OECD.
New Zealand All items, OECD. Data for this series are available quarterly. To
construct a monthly series we assume the index is unchanged in
the quarter.
Norway All items less food, OECD.
Portugal All items less food and rent, OECD.
Spain All items less food, OECD.29
Sweden All items, OECD.
UK All items excluding mortgage interest payments, Central
Statistics Office.
US All items excluding food and energy, Department of Labour.
All foreign exchange rates are sourced or derived from the RBA Bulletin Tables F.9
and F.10, except for US/CAD exchange rates prior to 1980 which come from IMF
International Financial Statistics.30
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